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Summary: This paper examines the interaction between the labour 
market, social standards and the European Social model on the one 
hand, and the freedom to provide services on the other. First, the au-
thors analyse whether the Viking and Laval judgements defi ne fun-
damental human rights as directly opposing fundamental economic 
freedoms in the internal market. Second, in the context of globalisa-
tion, EU enlargement, and the development of the so-called fl exicurity 
model, they gauge to what extent the process of establishing social 
standards confl icts with employment strategy. The authors further 
concentrate on the function and legitimacy of the right to collective 
action in the light of the open methods of coordination. They seek to 
provide an answer to whether the Viking and Laval cases represent 
another step towards the erosion of the European Social Model. 
I. Introduction
Interaction between the labour market, social standards and the Eu-
ropean Social Model on one hand, and the freedom to provide services on 
the other, poses a number of controversial questions.
Among the frequently asked questions are the following: what de-
fi nes a social Europe?  Is the European Social Model1 a myth or reality? 
How is it possible to ensure the sustainability of the European Social 
Model? 
Do the Viking and Laval judgments defi ne fundamental human rights 
as directly opposing fundamental economic freedoms in the internal mar-
ket? And secondly, in the context of globalisation, EU enlargement, and 
the development of the so-called fl exicurity model, to what extent does 
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1  A quick search on Google for the phrase “European Social Model” turns up more than 
271,000 hits. If you type in European Social Model + success” you get 93,000 results. So 
far so good, you might think. But “European Social Model + unemployment” turns up some 
98,000 pages. For more, see ‘Beyond the European Social Market Model’ <www.openeur-
ope.or.uk/research/fullbook/pdf> accessed 10 May 2008.
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the process of establishing social standards confl ict with employment 
strategies? 
As we can see, the questions are abundant. The answers, on the 
other hand, are neither simple nor unambiguous, but are rather quite 
complex. 
If we take the Lisbon strategy as our initial reference, its strategic 
goal is for the EU ‘to be (by 2010) the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.2 The search 
for a defi nition reveals that the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona 
European Council identify the European Social Model as one ‘based on 
good economic performance, a high level of social protection and educa-
tion and social dialogue’.3   
The European Social Model is usually understood as a vision of soci-
ety that combines sustainable economic growth with ever-improving liv-
ing and working conditions (employment, good quality jobs, equal oppor-
tunities, social protection for all, social inclusion and involving citizens in 
the decisions that affect them).4  
European economies are facing both external and internal pressures 
that have strained the sustainability of its social models, due to the pres-
sures of globalisation. As a result, increased fl exibility in the labour mar-
ket has prompted the EU to look for the path to solve the problems.
In addition, the 2004 EU enlargement brought specifi c problems. 
States with a lower level of social protection at work, and with poorer 
social and living standards have become Member States. Has neo-liberal 
capitalism, together with the values it promotes, ‘pushed’ the European 
Social Model to the edge?
What about collective agreements, a constituent of the European 
Social Model, in view of the fact that the collective action considered as 
a ‘restriction to the free provision of services’ may acquire different con-
notations?5
2  Presidency Conclusions of the March 2000 Lisbon European Council.
3  See para 22 of the Presidency Conclusions of the March 2002 Barcelona European Co-
uncil.
4  In the ETUC’s (European Trade Union Confederation) view, social dialogue, collective 
bargaining and workers’ protection are crucial factors in promoting innovation, productivity 
and competitiveness <www.etuc.org> accessed 12 May 2008.
5  ‘The weighing of economic freedoms against fundamental rights that the Court is asked to 
carry out is very similar if the merits concern the indirect State liability or in the (today still 
hypothetical) case of liability of private individuals for infringing TEC rules. What changes 
(beside the effects of those appraisals) is that in the fi rst case, even though the fundamental 
right exercised by private individuals is considered lawful, the State could nonetheless be 
held liable if it has not adopted all the measures that are necessary and compatible with the 
51CYELP 4 [2008] 49-74
If we look at the history of collective bargaining and the reinforce-
ment of social dialogue between employers, trade unions and the Com-
munity, we notice that they have developed at a sectoral as well as inter-
sectoral level. This was especially true during economic recession, when 
social dialogue was accepted as one of the desirable social and political 
initiatives and goals. Jacques Delors, Commission Chairman at the time, 
formulated the idea of social dialogue as an instrument for shaping social 
policy: ‘collective bargaining must remain one of the pillars of our econ-
omy, and every effort must be made to ensure harmonisation at Com-
munity level. That is the reason why I presented the idea … of European 
collective bargaining, which will ensure the requisite frame for achieving 
the broad market’.6
A new issue arises: could this statement be true after the recent 
judgements of ECJ?  
In the path towards further European enlargement and the deepen-
ing of the integration process among the present Member States, the cre-
ation of a new culture of industrial relations will help European economic 
subjects in the process of creating an environment where economic sub-
jects from the EC will be competent global players in the merciless world 
of market competition.  
This article will present the issue of social standards within the con-
text of globalisation and europeanisation. One section analyses collective 
bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements. Special attention 
will be given to the character of this process and the social dumping issue, 
as well as the impact of the recent judgements of ECJ on minimum social 
standards. The article will also examine the function and legitimacy of the 
right to collective action in the light of the open methods of coordination, 
and aims to provide an answer to whether the Viking and Laval cases rep-
resent another step towards the erosion of the European Social Model.   
II. Globalisation versus the europeanisation of law and social standards 
Globalisation in general not only includes integration over and above 
the borders of individual markets, but also the processes which are not 
defi ned by the market, and radically shapes human life. 
exercise of that right in order to remove the obstacle or reduce its impact on inter-Commu-
nity exchanges. It can therefore be concluded that the ‘immunity’ of a collective action from 
the constraints of Article 49 TEC depends on its qualifi cation as fundamental right in the 
Community legal order. However even in such a case, the Court of Justice is not deprived 
of its power to appraise the modalities of exercise of the right so as to weigh it against the 
fundamental freedoms of the Treaty that have allegedly been infringed’ G Orlandini, ‘Right 
to Strike, Transnational Collective Action and European Law: Time to Move On?’ (2007) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 8/07 23.
6  ‘The Social Dialogue - Euro Bargaining in the Making?’ (1992) 220 EIRR 25-27.  
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According to Waters, globalisation is ‘a social process in which the 
constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangement recede and 
in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding’.7 The 
OECD defi nes globalisation ‘... as a process in which economic markets, 
technologies, and communication patterns gradually exhibit more ‘global’ 
characteristics, and less ‘national’ or local ones’.8 Hamouda defi nes the 
term as a relative category: ‘economic globalisation... is an acceleration of 
capital integration beyond national borders’.9    
Globalisation10 is the overriding reason for change which compels 
far-reaching reforms, both worldwide and in the EU. The economic phe-
nomenon of globalisation builds up great political and social devastating 
power. One can wonder whether globalisation jeopardises social policy 
and democracy. This is primarily an economic phenomenon which infl u-
ences other areas (social policy, policy, law, culture, the media).      
According to the defi nition of the Group of Lisbon (1996), a distinc-
tion should be made between the terms internationalisation and globali-
sation: ‘Globalization refers to a multiplicity of linkages and interconnec-
tions between the states and societies which make up the present world 
system. It describes the process by which events, decision, and activities 
in one part of the world come to have signifi cant consequences for indi-
vidual and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Globaliza-
tion has two distinct phenomena: scope (or stretching) and intensity (or 
deepening). On the one hand, it defi nes a set of processes which embrace 
most of the globe or which operate worldwide; the concept therefore has 
a spatial connotation. On the other hand it also implies an intensifi cation 
of the levels of interaction, interconnectedness or interdependence be-
tween the states and societies which constitute the world Community’.11 
The trend of the europeanisation of the law of the EU Member States 
is characteristic and fairly clear. However, the relation between the euro-
peanisation and globalisation of law provokes some doubts.  
7  M Waters, Globalization (Routledge, New York 1995) 3. 
8  OECD, ‘Economic Globalization and Environment’ (1997) 19.
9  OE Hamouda, ‘Economic Integration: ‘Gobble-ization’ or Partnership: The Case of South-
ern Europe in Th Georgakopoulus, Ch Paraskevopoulus, J Smithin (eds), Economic Integra-
tion Between Unequal Partners (Aldershot, 1994) 188.
10 Although the concepts of internationalisation, multi-nationalisation and globalisation 
are generally and often formulated in a confusing way, they refer to different processes and 
phenomena. More important, they imply different actors, playing the game with different 
rules, and they have a signifi cantly different impact on strategies, policies and societies.
11  Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1996); Die Gruppe 
von Lissabon, Grenzen des Wettbewerbs (München 1997). See more in K Hübner, Der Glo-
balisierungskomplex (Sigma, Berlin 1998) 19.
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Snyder12 perceives the globalisation and europeanisation of law as 
both friends and rivals, claiming that these two processes complement, 
partially overlap, complete, and reinforce each other. At the same time, 
they represent a multiple network of legal orders in a constant inter-
lude between national, European, supranational and international law. 
On the topic of the europeanisation of law and globalisation, Voigt13 and 
Kreile14 hold that the internal market is a ‘laboratory of globalisation’ of 
law, while Nahamowith considers the europeanisation of law as the fi rst 
step of globalisation.15 However, we should agree with Voigt that these are 
two distinct processes, considered as such by scientifi c analysis.16 
The globalisation of law can be understood as the removal of bar-
riers to its scope of application,17 and the europeanisation of law as its 
regionalisation. Ultimately, they both have the same goal - the denation-
alisation of law. 
However, another issue arises: is this process detrimental to Euro-
pean social standards and the European Social Model?
The Anton Hemerijck Report, during the Netherlands’ Presidency in 
1997, is signifi cant in this respect, stressing the concept of ‘social policy 
as a productive factor’ and also stating ‘if social cohesion and stability 
are thus recognised as productive resources, then surely the contradic-
tion between social justice and economic effi ciency break down. Social 
policy can then no longer be perceived as leading to consumption-related 
benefi ts, taken out of an effi cient economy by distributive politics. Social 
policy itself becomes a productive resource which, instead of counter-
ing economic policy by protecting or ‘decommodifying’ labour, comes to 
play a part in improving the economy’s performance potential. From this 
perspective, social policy and economic performance are closely, perhaps 
even indissolubly, interconnected’.18
12  F Snyder, ‘Europeanisation and Globalisation as Friends and Rivals: European Union 
Law in the Global Economic Network’ in F Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2000) 293.
13  R Voigt, ‘Globalisierung des Rechts: Entsteht eine dritte Rechtsordnung?’ in R Voigt, 
Globalisierung des Rechts (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000) 25.
14  M Kreile, ‘Globalisierung und europäische Integration’ in W Merkel, A Busch Demokratie 
in Ost und West (Frankfurt / Main, 1999) 605-623.
15  P Nahamowitz, ‘Das Europarecht als ‘teilglobalisiertes’ Rechtssystem: Genügt der EG-
Vertrag den Anforderungen der ‘Globalisierung’? in  R Voigt Globalisierung des Rechts 
(Nomos, Baden - Baden 2000) 141 ff.
16  R Voigt, ‘Globalisierung des Rechts: Entsteht eine dritte Rechtsordnung?’ (n 13) 25.
17  L Brock, M Alber, ‘Entgrenzung der Staatenwelt. Zur Analyse weltgesellschaftlicher En-
twicklungstendenzen’ (1995) 2 Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen 261.
18  The Netherlands’ Presidency of the EU, Social Policy and Economic Performance (The 
Hague Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 1997) 87.
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The Wim Kok Level Group Report on the Lisbon strategy19 gave the 
key recommendation for ‘the Member States to focus on growth and em-
ployment in order to underpin social cohesion and sustainable develop-
ment’.
The question remains whether it is possible to achieve the Lisbon 
goals through balanced efforts on both the economic and social front.
The EC document has attracted attention and criticism from both 
the professional and general public. Namely, on 22 November 2006 the 
Commission of the European Communities issued a Green Paper on 
‘Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’.20
In its introduction, it states that the Commission proposals contrib-
ute to applying the Lisbon Strategy.21 It further states that the political 
challenges, technical development and globalisation require new fl exible 
forms in labour law (regarding working time, the form of labour contracts, 
etc). The intention was, on the one hand, to prompt debate and fi nd op-
timal solutions, and, on the other hand, to ensure workplace security. It 
seems that the authors of this document believe that fl exicurity is at the 
same time a magic word and a solution.
The Green Paper raised issues that will be even more pronounced 
in the coming period; notably, the issue of standard and atypical labour 
contracts, the issue of consigned workers, especially in the domain of 
atypical employment relations and their employment status. Even the 
European Parliament has expressed its view in its Conclusion of 11 July 
2007,22 followed by the Report on this document by the rapporteur Jacek 
Protasiewicz.23
Concurrently, with the discussion of the Green Paper, the Commis-
sion has promoted the concept of fl exicurity. 
The Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of Regions of 27 June 2007 proposes joint principles of fl exicurity. All 
19  Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment. Report from the 
high level group chaired by Wim Kok (2004).
20  KOM (2006) endgültig.
21  Lisbon Presidency Conclusions para 5.
22  Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 11. July 2007 zu einem moderneren 
Arbeitsrecht für die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts (2007/2023(INI)) http://
www.europaparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0339+0+DOC+XML+V0//DEεtlanguage=DE.
23  Report on Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st century 
(2007/2023(INI)), Committee on Employment and Social Affairs http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORTεtreference=A6-2007-0247εtlanguage=ENεtmode=
XML. 
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Member States have to accept the principles.24 The following elements of 
fl exicurity are proposed: fl exible and admissible agreements (contracts) 
through modern labour legislation, collective agreements and forms of 
workers’ associations, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effi -
cient and active policy measures for the labour market, and modern sys-
tem of social security.  
Apart from the above, the 2004 EU enlargement also raised some 
specifi c issues. States with a lower level of social protection at work, 
and with lower social and living standards became Member States.25  Of 
course we have to be aware that liberalisation of the market also means 
liberalisation of national rules, and that it opens specifi c questions re-
garding the market and the participants in it.
The European Court of Justice interprets extensively economic 
freedoms in a manner to actually secure basic personal and social rights. 
The EC law on free movement involves the (horizontal) distribution of 
regulatory competence between the EU Member States. It is a rather dif-
fi cult task to defi ne the fi eld of application of the rules, especially in the 
economic context where services are almost indivisible or tightly con-
nected to goods. It is particularly diffi cult to demarcate whether restric-
tions are an infringement of the rules concerning the freedom to provide 
services or the freedom of establishment,26 or whether to apply the rules 
on the freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment in the 
EU law.
The distinction between the rules which apply to the freedom to pro-
vide services and the freedom of establishment27 is based on ambivalent 
criteria, given the fact that the economic activities that are performed 
may be covered by the rules of both freedoms. Establishment means the 
actual performance of economic activities, continuously and permanent-
ly, through permanent establishment in another Member State over an 
indefi nite period of time. 
24  KOM (2007) 359 endgültig <http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_stra-
tegy/pdf/fl ex_comm_de.pdf>.
25  ‘The average income per head in the 10 new Member States was well less than half of 
the average income level in the EU-15, the employment rate, still low with 64.3% in 2002 
for the EU-15, was reduced to 63% for the EU-25; the 10 new Member States reached an 
employment rate of 62.4%, taking the enlarged EU even further from its 70% employment 
target’ Stefaan Hermans, ‘The Social Agenda of the European Union and the Modernisation 
of the European Social Model’  (Winter 2005) 33 Collegium 5.
26  V Hatzopoulos, ‘Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services’ 
(2000) 37 CML Rev 45.
27 Article 43 TEC. In Croatian literature, see more on establishment: E Kucich, ‘Right to 
Establishment and Recognition of the Legal Subjectivity of a Foreign Company According to 
EU Law and the Law of the Republic of Croatia’ (Master’s thesis, University of Rijeka 2004) 
30 ff.
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The Court of Justice set out in its decision in the Gebhard28 case 
two very important rules to distinguish between the term establishment 
and the free provision of services in the scope of applying one of them. 
Nowadays, after the ruling of the ECJ, the impact of the Laval judgement 
is that the Court interprets Article 49 EC in the light of the Posting of 
Workers Directive. As the so-called Gebhard formula has so far been ap-
plied, a restriction on the free movement of services can be accepted only 
if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justifi ed 
by overriding reasons of public interest. But even if that were the case, 
it would still have to be suitable to achieve the objective pursued and 
must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see, inter alia, Case 
C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-4165). However, in the Laval Case, the 
proportionality test is applied in a different way.29 
A consequence of the Laval judgement is that the idea of equal treat-
ment of domestic and foreign service providers as regards wages and em-
ployment conditions is put aside by the principle of minimum protection, 
whereby the host state - the state or the social partners - may not require 
anything more than the nucleus of mandatory rules.30
According to the above, we can say that the ECJ judgments will 
serve to further increase the fl exibility of the labour market to the detri-
ment of social standards. 
III. Collective agreements and collective bargaining: general remarks
The economic aspects of harmonising the freedom to provide serv-
ices, market competition, working conditions and the economy in the 
European Internal Market require applicable and effective forms. 
At the present stage of development, European collective labour law 
is insuffi ciently unifi ed and we may speak of a certain particularism in 
this area. Actually, there are still fi elds of collective labour law today which 
have remained within the exclusive competence of Member States.31
Collective bargaining draws the attention of both the professional 
and wider audience. Two specifi c periods may be recognised in the de-
velopment of collective bargaining. Authors usually indicate that in most 
28  Case C-55/94, Gebhard (1995) ECR I-4165, where the activity of a German lawyer had 
to be determined. He was a member of the German bar association, but was living and per-
forming his activity in Italy, for domestic and foreign clients. For more detail on the Gebhard 
case, see J PecotiÊ, ‘Freedom of Establishment in the EC Law’ (2004) 8 Law and Taxes 66.
29  J Malmberg, ‘Collective Agreements and Collective Bargaining: Analyses of the Impact of 
the European Court of Justice Ruling on Laval & Viking (26 February 2008) Meeting with the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Working Paper 5.
30  Ibid.
31  See Art 137 Section 6 of the EC Treaty (for example, the right to association, the right to 
cease work, to strike and lock-out). 
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states the legislator fi rst accepted and created a legal frame for collec-
tive bargaining (validity of contracts, recognition of the right to indus-
trial action). The second dividing point occurred in the period from the 
early 1970s to the end of the 1980s, when states started to play a more 
dynamic role in collective labour relations. From that moment on, states 
began to instigate collective bargaining and collaboration between social 
partners at different levels.32 
In the legislature of most European Members States, EC collective 
agreements are defi ned as formal written agreements whose feature is 
that they regulate the working conditions of employees. Usually, the par-
ties are employers, a group of employers or an association of employers 
on one side, and representatives of employees or an organisation of em-
ployees (a trade union) on the other side. Denmark and Great Britain do 
not have a legal defi nition of a collective agreement.33 Denmark does not 
require a written form of collective agreement, although such agreements 
are mostly made in a written form.34 One more fact should be pointed out. 
In Italy, Great Britain and the Nordic countries, collective agreements are 
considered primarily to be private law agreements, whereas in Belgium, 
Spain35 and France they are more tightly connected with public law. It 
should also be pointed out that the understanding of the nature of col-
lective agreements in German law36 lies somewhere between these two 
solutions.37 
In the wider sense, collective bargaining is the negotiating process 
regarding interests, including all sorts of two-sided and three-sided dis-
cussions about problems regarding work which, directly or indirectly, 
affect employees.38 
32  The best example for this is the Auroux legislature in France and the legislation of Spain 
and Portugal, which contain the obligation to collective bargaining in good faith. This domi-
nant opinion is realised in the Swedish Act on Co-determination at Work.
33  N Bruun, ‘The Autonomy of Collective Agreement’ in R Blanpain (ed), Collective Bargain-
ing, Discrimination, Social Security and European Integration (Kluwer, The Hague, London, 
New York  2003) 3. 
34  Nielsen describes the Danish concept of collective agreements as ‘broad and imprecise’. 
Ruth Nielsen, European Law (DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen 2000) 116.
35  Guía de la negociación colectiva 2006, Comisión consultiva nacional de convenios colec-
tivos, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
36  P Hanau, K Adomeit, Arbeitsrecht (Luchterhand 2006) 277 ff;  Ulrich Zachert, ‘Collective 
Bargaining in Germany’ in Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, Collec-
tive Bargaining in Europe (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid 2005) 27-51.
37  N Bruun (n 33) 3. 
38  See further: E Cordova, ‘Collective Bargaining’ in R. Blanpain (ed), Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations (3rd ed Kluwer, Deventer 1987); R Blanpain (ed), Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (5th edn Kluwer, 
Deventer 1993). 
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Collective bargaining in the stricter sense includes the negotiating 
process of negotiations between employers and employees, as well as 
agreements which contain binding rules.39 
If we analyse the practice of the EC Member States, it is evident that 
collective bargaining has mostly been used as a means to defi ne stand-
ards and advance legal standards.  It is known that in Denmark collective 
agreements are the foundation for guaranteeing rights and high labour 
standards. As some authors say,40 collective agreements in Denmark and 
Sweden might be described as the autonomous collective agreements 
model: the exclusive responsibility of the trade unions to safeguard a 
general level of wages and employment conditions. At the same time, in 
Great Britain collective agreements are not legally binding between the 
parties.  
On one hand, we have Member States such as Belgium, France, 
Germany and Greece where the provisions of collective agreements may 
be given an erga omnes effect or a wider legal effect by law.41 This is in 
contrast to other legislatures which are not familiar with the institute of 
widening the application of a collective agreement.
Gorelli, Valverde and Gordillo point out four technical problems 
which appear in collective bargaining, relating to the:  
1. potential subjects of collective bargaining; 
2. procedure to be followed in collective bargaining 
3. obligations that these agreements carry, and
4. problems of articulation and complementation between European 
collective agreements and national regulations.42 
We can agree with those43 who hold that the Viking and Laval cases 
concern delicate matters of how to balance social policy objectives with 
economic freedoms. 
As its most important conclusion, the ECJ must provide a truly con-
stitutional answer on how to settle confl icts between the social struc-
tures of Member States that still remain within their own area of compe-
tence, and the dynamics of EC law that seemingly favours the spirit of 
39  See further Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised 
Market Economies (n 38) 570 ff.
40  Malmberg (n 29) 5.
41  E Cordova (n 38) 298, 329; C Barnard, EC Employment Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford, New 
York, 2000) 558. 
42  GR Gordillo, J Gorelli Hernández, A Valverde, Marco laboral y relaciones colectivas en la 
Unión Europea, Informe al Consejo Económico y Social de Andalucía (Seville, 2002) 32-33.   
43  For example, N Reich, ‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union: the Laval 
and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ (2008) 9 (2) German Law Journal 128.
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free movement to the detriment of the social arrangements of the Nordic 
countries.44
Collective bargaining provides important elements of fl exibility, sub-
sidiarity, self-determination and refl exivity in social dialogue in a greater 
number of EC Member States. Arguments of a social nature refer to the 
need to avoid social dumping. Collective agreements may guarantee, in a 
balanced manner, adjustment to the business conditions in a globalised 
economy and secure minimum social standards. They also enable the 
creation of effective mechanisms for a culture of social dialogue at work, 
which is also a general benefi t.45 
The contractual parties usually determine the content of collective 
bargaining and agreements. This includes fi rst of all normative disposi-
tions, and contractual or obligatory dispositions. Normative dispositions 
determine the notions and working conditions which must be respected in 
each labour contract concluded in a single company (this includes all as-
pects of work, wages, other benefi ts, for example leave of absence and va-
cations, classifi cation of working positions, working hours, informing and 
consulting employees, participation of employees in decision-making and 
procedural dispositions).46 Contractual and obligatory dispositions cover 
the rights and obligations of the parties. The most frequent contracted 
obligation is the one regarding the amicable resolution of disputes47 (of an 
absolute or relative nature). When the parties are obliged to refrain from 
initiating industrial action, the nature thereof is absolute,48 whereas it is 
of a relative nature when neither of the parties is allowed to initiate in-
dustrial action to change the conditions of the collective agreement dur-
ing the entire period of validity of the collective agreement. The relative 
obligation to resolve disputes amicably enables trade unions to protect 
the rights of employees in the event of important changes in the socio-
economic environment.49 The authority to conclude collective agreements 
includes the authority to negotiate, conclude and ratify agreements. The 
44  Ibid 127.
45  Bruun (n 33) 42. 
46  Barnard (n 41) 557ff. 
47  The obligation of the amicable resolution of disputes is known in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Spain. In Spain, the obligation has 
only an absolute character if it is so agreed between the parties. In France and Italy, the 
obligation to resolve disputes amicably is rarely included in collective agreements since 
it is considered to be some sort of limitation of the right to strike.  In France, the Labour 
Act sets out that the parties to a collective agreement are obliged not to do anything which 
might compromise the truthful implementation of the agreement within the boundaries 
determined by the agreement itself. 
48  R Birk, ‘Industrial Confl ict: The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs’ in Blanpain Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (n 38) 413.
49  Barnard (n 41) 557 ff.  
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necessary authority of associations (employers and trade unions) is given 
to them by their members, or it arises from the legal regulations of a cer-
tain EC Member State. 
Collective bargaining is marked by coordination among the negotiat-
ing parties. The parties try to accomplish common goals through coordi-
nation. Coordination may include procedural questions, as well as sub-
stantial questions which shape separate but mutually connected rounds 
of collective bargaining. Coordination plays the most important role in 
the decentralised negotiation environment. The process of vertical and 
horizontal coordination in relation to the challenges of the EU and multi-
national corporations has recently strengthened in Europe.50  
The question of coordinating tariff policies and concluding collec-
tive agreements is most evident at the so-called Doorn group.51 The rep-
resentative trade unions from Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands expressed in a common statement in 1998 their will to cre-
ate tighter cross-border coordination of tariff policies within the member 
states of the monetary union, highlighting that the goal was the conclu-
sion of such a collective agreement to enable greater employment. Trade 
unions have agreed to continue the coordination of cross-border policies 
on wages based on the Doorn formula.52 
‘The Doorn Declaration’ contains the fi rst common instructions for 
collective bargaining (trade unions from different European countries).53 
There are evident methodological diffi culties in the interpretation of col-
lective agreement dispositions or the ‘calculation of collective agreement 
dispositions’ values’.        
Certain fi elds of industry, such as the metal industry, have also 
adopted the ‘European coordination rules’.54 
50  Ibid. 512-513.
51  On 7 and 8 September 2000, more than 50 trade union representatives from Belgium, 
Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands met for the 4th time at a so-called joint meeting of 
the ‘Doorn group’. The group borrowed the name from the city of Doorn in the Netherlands.
52  See further M Schmidt, ‘Das Arbeitsrecht der Europäische Gemeinschaft’ (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden 2001) 332.
53  They refer to: accomplishing such agreements regarding the growth or productivity and 
wage increase; the increase of the buying capacity of employees and measures to create new 
working places (for example diminishing working hours); regular informing and consulta-
tion regarding the development of collective bargaining. Blanpain Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (n 38) 567 ff. See also <www.
eurofound.ie> accessed 24 January 2007. 
54  European coordination rules contain principles which the national negotiators will up-
hold in order to avoid unfair market competition and social dumping with regards to wages 
and working conditions. The European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) points out that it is 
important for trade unions to maintain full autonomy and also full responsibility regarding 
the implementation of collective agreements, respecting, of course, the different national 
circumstances and the conditions which exist in national legal systems.  
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Collective bargaining may be divided into centralised and decentral-
ised bargaining. Centralised bargaining means coordinated negotiation. 
Up to the beginning of the 1980s, this was a feature of the Scandinavian 
countries and Austria, Australia and New Zealand. This way of negotiat-
ing has kept its particular signifi cance in Finland, Denmark and Belgium, 
and also Spain, Ireland and France. Most European countries tradition-
ally opt for collective bargaining at the level of one fi eld of industry.55   
In December 2000, the ETUC Executive Committee confi rmed the 
guidelines on the coordination of wage bargaining.56 
IV. Impact of the recent ECJ rulings 
One of the most important features of the regulatory function of col-
lective bargaining is the power to derogate from the mandatory provisions 
of labour legislation. 
Derogatory powers are displayed in various kinds of labour legisla-
tion in the form of derogation clauses, as well as in the so-called ‘opening 
clauses’ or ‘hardship clauses’ and ‘salary opt-out clauses’.  
Derogation clauses in Sweden and Finland are quite commonly ne-
gotiated by labour organisations representing employees at national lev-
el. Such organisations are empowered under the law to agree on deroga-
tion from mandatory provisions in a collective agreement which applies 
nationwide. 
Another example of derogatory power is the so-called ‘opening claus-
es’ or ‘hardship clauses’ known in Austrian and German law. Opening 
clauses provide a restrictive possibility for companies to diverge from col-
lectively defi ned minimum standards. 
55  GJ Bamber, P Sheldon, ‘Collective Bargaining: Towards Decentralization?’ in R Blanpain 
(ed), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies 
(8th rev edn Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2004) 516 ff.
56  This document contains three main goals: to enable trade unions to give general instruc-
tions on a European level in relation to collective bargaining regarding wages, as a response 
to the policy of the European Commission and the European Central Bank, and to affect the 
‘macro-economic dialogue’ on  a European level;
to avoid situations which may lead to social dumping and wage dumping and divergence in 
Europe; and to coordinate demands regarding wages in Europe, in particular in countries 
which are members of the European monetary union, and bring convergence criteria to a 
higher level, particularly in respect of living standards. The formula contained in the said 
document should also be pointed out: ‘nominal wage increases should at least exceed infl a-
tion, while maximising the proportion of productivity allocated to the rise in gross wages 
in order to secure a better balance between profi ts and wages, and any remaining part of 
productivity should be used to fund other aspects in collective agreements, such as qualita-
tive aspects of work where these are quantifi able and calculable in terms of cost’ Guideline 
on Collective Bargaining Coordination (ETUC executive committee) <www.eurofound.ie> ac-
cessed 2 January 2007.
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In Spain, derogation powers take the form of ‘salary opt-out claus-
es’, allowing fi nancially jeopardised companies to opt-out of potentially 
harmful provisions of collective agreements.57 
We have pointed in the introduction to the particularities of collective 
agreements and collective bargaining. It is particularly important in this 
paper to further focus on different categories of collective bargaining in 
Sweden. There are four specifi c situations where the factual background 
is actually different. This important difference comes down to what hap-
pens if the social partners disagree: fi rst - core collective bargaining;  sec-
ond - collective bargaining according to the co-determination model; third 
- also the co-determination model, but negotiations take place against a 
background of reinforced trade union infl uence; and fourth - collective 
bargaining based on semi-mandatory law.
Even before the Viking and Laval judgments, Norberg and Num-
hauser-Henning58 indicated the problem in the fourth way of collective 
bargaining, highlighting  that: ‘To protect individuals rights, to use col-
lective agreements as instruments of implementation does not absolve 
the Member State from taking full responsibility for guaranteeing full 
coverage of the Directive. The semi-mandatory technique frequently used 
in Sweden to implement Directives seems to address these issues ad-
equately. Where the traditional autonomy of the social partners is more 
demanding - as is the case with wage setting - statutory intervention is 
considerably less attractive, though. To implement the rules on minimum 
legislation in the Posting Directive, Sweden thus relies on Lex Britan-
nia,59 leaving the trade unions to combat social dumping by means of 
collective bargaining and industrial action in a legal setting which seems 
to open for discriminatory practices towards foreign employers. The stat-
ute-based immunity for collective agreements explicitly stated in national 
competition law may also - in combination with extensive collective bar-
gaining rights within the area of managerial prerogatives - occasionally 
produce confl icts with EU law.’ 
But let us take one step at the time. Recent judgements have caused 
great controversy and disagreement.  
57  Bruun (n 33) 14.
58  P Norberg and A Numhauser-Henning, ‘Collective Bargaining in Sweden’ in Comisión 
Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, Collective Bargaining in Europe (Ministerio de 
Ttrabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid 2004) 240-273; see also Bruun (n 33) 32 and 33. 
59  The risk of social dumping is when foreign employers bring their employees to Sweden 
to per form work. It has been dealt with by the Co-Determination Act and its rules on Lex 
Britannia. Lex Britannia thus applies even when Swedish law otherwise does not apply, for 
instance to foreign ships temporarily visiting a Swedish port. It also applies to situations cov-
ered by Council Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers. The law implementing this 
directive indicates statutory minimum conditions in cases covered by it. However, there 
are no statutory minimum wages in Sweden and this is where industrial action and Lex 
Britannia come into the picture. 
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IV.1. More economic, less social?
The Internal Market should represent the end of obstacles on the 
free movement of services, capital, goods and workers.60 Analysing the 
relation of labour law within the context of economic freedoms, Gerard 
Lyon-Caen talks of the ‘infi ltration of competition law into labour law’.61 
In 1992, Lord Wedderburn claimed that ‘(H)istory writes the gram-
mar of the labour law system which still survives even though subse-
quent social events have changed the story’.62
The same author in 2007 stated that ‘The discrepancy between the 
growing power of employers benefi ting from European transnational eco-
nomic integration, and the relative weakness of a declining labour move-
ment which remains largely confi ned to national boundaries in its col-
lective bargaining and collective action has profound implications for the 
future of the European Union’.63
For the purpose of creating a balance between the social rights of 
workers and the market freedoms of employers, S Sciarra recommends 
the use of judicial escamotage (judicial juggling).64
This hardly comes as a surprise when we remember that the labour 
law, including European labour law, has been a fairly protected area. As 
Malberg rightly claims: ‘in the shadow of the internal market a territorial 
struggle is in progress over where labour law ends and economic rules 
take over’.65
The Laval and Viking cases are an illustration of this struggle. These 
judgments also call into question social standards and the social model, 
since, in the opinions of the Advocates General (characteristic in both 
cases), it can be concluded that the Treaty’s market freedom articles 
could be directly or indirectly interfered with by industrial action, but 
that such trade union action could in some circumstances be ‘justifi ed’, 
so long as it were ‘proportional’ or ‘appropriate’.
However, let us turn to the ECJ judgements. 
60  MG Garofalo, ‘Un Profi lo Ideologico del Diritto del Lavoro?’ in Studi di Lavoro: Scritti in 
onore di Gino Giugni (Cacucci 1999) 453 and 466.
61  G Lyon-Caen, ‘L’infi ltration du droit Travail par le droit de la Concurrence?’ (1992) Droit 
Ouvrier 313. See also A Lyon-Caen, ‘Droit Social et Droit de la Concurrence’ in Orientations 
sociales du droit contemporaine: Ecrits en l’honeur du Prof Jean Savatier (Paris 1992). 
62  L Wedderburn, Freedom of Association and Community Protection: A Comparative In-
quiry into Trade Union Rights in the Member States of the EC and into the Need for Inter-
vention at Community Level (Unpublished Report for the European Commission).
63  L Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law 2008: 40 Years On’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 397.
64  S Sciarra, ‘Market Freedom and Fundamental Rights’ in B Hepple (ed), Social and Labour 
Rights in a Global Context (CUP, Cambridge 2002) 95-121.
65  Malmberg (n 29) 1.
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In the Laval and Viking cases, the ECJ actually gave priority to fun-
damental market freedoms in relation to trade union collective actions. 
The fi rst clarifi cation of the judgements is that the right to collective ac-
tion is not excluded from the scope of the application of Article 49 EC (on 
the free movement of services) or Article 43 EC (on the freedom of estab-
lishment). Further, Articles 43 and 49 EC are capable of conferring rights 
on a private undertaking which may be relied on against a trade union or 
an association of trade union.  
Both cases examine the issue of trade union measures against ‘social 
dumping’. Actually, the issue arising from both cases is whether trade 
union activities (strikes and boycotts) prevent employers from using their 
market freedoms to gain competitive advantage, based on the wage gap 
between ‘old Member States’ and ‘new Member States’.
We believe that it is necessary to recall the time when the adoption of 
the so-called ‘Monti regulation’ was being prepared. There was tension be-
tween the regime on the free movement of goods on one hand, and national 
industrial relations on the other. It was found that industrial action carried 
on at national level might factually hinder the free movement of goods.66
Therefore, one should remember the judgment in case C-265/95 con-
cerning acts of violent destruction by French farmers regarding the import 
of Spanish fruit and vegetable, and the question of corresponding meas-
ures aimed at prevent the violence. The ECJ took the position that the 
French Republic had infringed its obligations by failing to adopt all neces-
sary and proportionate measures to prevent the free movement of fruit and 
vegetable from being obstructed by the action of private individuals. 
There was debate regarding the adoption of a Council Regulation. 
The proposed regulation intended to cover at least some industrial action 
and gave the Commission competence to intervene in national procedures 
when obstacles to the free movement on goods occurred at national level. 
There was also the question of the immunity and autonomy of national 
industrial relations systems in relation to the fundamental principle of 
the free movements of goods.
The debate resulted in a clear position which served as a guideline 
for interpretation in confl ict situations (Regulation 2679/98/EC Art 2):
‘The regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the 
exercise to fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, in-
cluding the right or freedom to strike. These rights may also include 
the right or freedom to take the other conditions covered by the spe-
cifi c industrial relations system in Member States.’67
66  N Bruun and B Veneziani, ‘The Right or Freedom to Transnational Industrial Action in 
the European Union’ in A Legal Framework for European Industrial relations (ETUI, Brus-
sels 1999) 542.
67  Regulation 2679/98/EC (7 December 1998).
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The ECJ judgement of 21 September 1999 in the Albany case gave 
priority to solidarity action and collective bargaining autonomy over the 
four market freedoms, while the Schmidberger judgement came out in 
favour of consideration case by case.
Both Advocates General in the Viking and Laval cases follow the 
Schmidberger line,68 and the positions taken in the Omega case,69 which 
is not surprising.  
Advocate General Maduro70 claims that although TEC achieved the 
common market, it also created its negative effects. 
Kochner rightly claims that it seems that we all forget the relations 
in the ‘social contract’ and that we should be able to accept the negative 
consequences, along with the specifi c working conditions.71 
68  The Court has also recently dealt with fundamental rights as constraints to economic 
freedoms in the Schmidberger case. The issue arose regarding the demonstration organised 
by an environmental group, implicitly permitted by Austrian authorities, which resulted in 
the complete closure of the Brenner motorway to traffi c for almost 30 hours. Schmidberger, 
a German-based international carrier, claimed damages against the Republic of Austria, 
arguing that the failure of Austrian authorities to ban the demonstration constituted a 
restriction on the free movement of goods. The ECJ ruled that the restriction of the free 
movement of goods can be justifi ed by the legitimate interest in the protection of funda-
mental human rights, such as the protesters’ right to freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly. However, the ECJ points out that a fair balance must be struck between all 
the interests involved, and that it is upon the Court to determine from the circumstances of 
the case ‘whether the restrictions placed upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the 
light of the legitimate objective pursued’ (para 82). The “proportionality” in the case in which 
the derogation from a fundamental freedom under the TEC is based on the need to protect 
another fundamental right acquires a “bilateral” signifi cance, since also the latter admits 
limitations that are necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued.
69  In the Omega case, the Court ruled that the protection of a fundamental right comes un-
der the grounds of public policy that, pursuant to Article 55 TEC, justify a restriction of the 
freedom conferred by Article 49 TEC.  German authorities prohibited a German company 
from operating a game, whose object was fi ring on human targets using a laser beam or 
other technical devices (so called ‘playing at killing’), as dangerous to public order.
Since the German company used the equipment and technology provided by a British com-
pany, the issue of infringement of Community law arose, particularly Articles 49 to 55 TEC 
on the freedom to provide services, and Articles 28 to 30 TEC on the free movement of goods. 
The ECJ held that the respect of human dignity, one of the German constitutional principles, 
constitutes a legitimate interest capable of justifying restriction of the freedom to provide 
services, if the measure is proportionate to the goal pursued and if it is deemed necessary.   
70   ’Although the Treaty establishes the common market, it does not turn a blind eye to the 
workers who are adversely affected by its negative traits. On the contrary, the European 
economic order is fi rmly anchored in a social contract: workers throughout Europe must 
accept the recurring negative consequences that are inherent to the common market’s crea-
tion of increasing prosperity, in exchange for which society must commit itself to the gen-
eral improvement of their living and working conditions, and to the provision of economic 
support to those workers who, as a consequence of market forces, come into diffi culties’ 
(Opinion GA Maduro, 23 May 2007, C - 438/05 Viking para 59). 
71  E Kochner, ‘Kollektivverhandlungen und Tarifautonomie-welche Rolle spielt das eu-
ropäische Recht’ (2008) 1-2 AuR 16.
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However, the next issue is one relating to social values and how to 
protect them. The protection of employers and their working and social 
rights and social standards are likely to become even more signifi cant in 
the future.  
It seems very important to emphasise the position taken by GA Ma-
duro, who claims that:
[a]lthough the right to take collective action, including the right to 
strike, must therefore be recognised as a fundamental right which 
forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law 
the observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right 
may none the less be subject to certain restrictions. As is reaffi rmed 
by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, those rights are to be protected in accordance with Commu-
nity law and national law and practices. In addition, as is apparent 
from paragraph 5 of this judgment, under Finnish law the right to 
strike may not be relied on, in particular, where the strike is contra 
bonos mores or is prohibited under national law or Community law 
(para 44, the Viking case).
The issue at stake was the aim, ie the protection of jobs, and the is-
sue of maintaining and protecting social standards. This is essentially a 
question of socio-legal protection, as a result of re-fl agging, and the issue 
of laying off employees. According to the opinion of GA Maduro, if the re-
fl agging does not jeopardise jobs, then collective action is not aimed at 
the protection of employees’ rights. 
The situation is interesting since ITF and its campaign against fl ags 
of convenience is at play here. We would like to point to paragraph 88 of 
the judgement:
 in relation to the collective action seeking to ensure the implemen-
tation of the policy in question pursued by ITF, it must be empha-
sised that, to the extent that that policy results in ship owners being 
prevented from registering their vessels in a State other than that 
of which the benefi cial owners of those vessels are nationals, the 
restrictions on freedom of establishment resulting from such action 
cannot be objectively justifi ed. Nevertheless, as the national court 
points out, the objective of that policy is also to protect and improve 
seafarers’ terms and conditions of employment.72
72  See also  para 89 Viking: ‘However, as is apparent from the fi le submitted to the Court, 
in the context of its policy of combating the use of fl ags of convenience, ITF is required, 
when asked by one of its members, to initiate solidarity action against the benefi cial owner 
of a vessel which is registered in a State other than that of which that owner is a national, 
irrespective of whether or not that owner’s exercise of its right of freedom of establishment 
is liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions of employment of its employees. 
Therefore, as Viking argued during the hearing without being contradicted by ITF in that 
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Another issue was whether the trade union has more appropriate 
means and instruments than the ones used in the present case.73
In the present case, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent 
from paragraphs 35 and 36 of the present judgment, the collective ac-
tion taken by FSU and ITF is aimed at concluding an agreement which 
is meant to regulate the work of Viking employees collectively, and, that 
those two trade unions are organisations which are not public law enti-
ties but exercise the legal autonomy conferred on them, inter alia, by 
national law.
IV.2. The Viking and Laval cases
Let us consider the facts in the Viking and Laval cases. 
Viking 
The facts
Viking is a Finnish-based ferry operator. One of its vessels, called 
Rosella, plies the route between Tallinn (Estonia) and Helsinki (Finland) 
under a Finnish fl ag. Estonian vessels operating on the same route with 
lower wage costs were a direct competition to Viking, and Rosella was 
running at a loss. In order to gain competitive advantage, Viking’s man-
agement decided to re-fl ag the vessel, using the Estonian fl ag. The deci-
sion was also taken to employ Estonian labour in order to take advantage 
of the fact that wages are lower in Estonia.  In response, the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union (FSU - the crew of the Rosella are its members) warned 
Viking that they might take collective action to stop the re-fl agging proc-
ess. To avoid the danger of being undercut, it also asked the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) under its “Flag of conveniences cam-
paign” to ask their members not to start negotiations with Viking unless 
they were based in Finland. According to this campaign, the ITF affi li-
ates (600 unions in 140 different states) agreed that only trade unions 
established in the state of benefi cial ownership should have the right to 
regard, the policy of reserving the right of collective negotiations to trade unions of the State 
of which the benefi cial owner of a vessel is a national is also applicable where the vessel is 
registered in a State which guarantees workers a higher level of social protection than they 
would enjoy in the fi rst State’.
73  ‘As regards the question of whether or not the collective action at issue in the main 
proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued, it is for the 
national court to examine, in particular, on the one hand, whether, under the national rules 
and collective agreement law applicable to that action, FSU did not have other means at its 
disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a suc-
cessful conclusion the collective negotiations entered into with Viking, and, on the other, 
whether that trade union had exhausted those means before initiating such action  (para 
87).
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conclude collective agreements covering the vessel concerned. The main 
purpose of re-fl agging, ie to reduce wage costs, would be frustrated if the 
crew continued to be employed on the conditions laid down by Finnish 
law and applicable collective agreements. 
Viking initiated legal proceedings before the High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales, the Queen’s Bench Division, in order to declare that 
the action taken by ITF and FSU imposed restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment contrary to Article 43 EC, and alternatively restrictions on 
the freedom of movement of workers and the freedom to provide services 
under Articles 39 EC and 49 EC. The Court of Appeal, deciding on the 
appeal submitted by ITF and FSU against the decision granting the form 
of order sought by Viking, referred to the Court of Justice under Com-
munity law. 
The judgement
The ECJ recognised the right to take collective action, including the 
right to strike as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of 
the general principles of Community law. Nevertheless, this right might 
be restricted, as reaffi rmed by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union which states that it is to be protected in 
accordance with Community law and national law and practices. Fur-
thermore, the exercise of this right may be subject to certain restric-
tions.
Laval 
The facts
Laval and Partners Ltd is a Latvian construction company which 
was awarded a public contract for the refurbishment of a school in Vax-
holm, Sweden. Laval posted its Latvian workers to Sweden to fulfi l the 
contract, subject to working conditions and other terms agreed with the 
Baltic trade union. As is standard practice in the Swedish industrial rela-
tions system, the Swedish unions (Swedish Building and Public Works 
Trade Union and its local branch No. 1) started negotiations with Laval 
in order to sign a collective agreement with regard to wages and other 
working conditions, which are always laid down by negotiation on a case-
by-case basis. Laval did not want to pay the wages requested and refused 
to sign a collective agreement in Sweden.  Following the failure of the 
Swedish negotiations, the Swedish trade unions took action by blockad-
ing the construction site. Solidarity actions then followed from the elec-
tricians’ trade union. Laval brought the proceedings before the Swedish 
court to obtain a declaration that the industrial action was unlawful, as 
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it represented an infringement of the right to provide services conferred 
by Article 49 EC and the provision of Directive 96/71/EC concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The 
Swedish Labour Court referred the case to the European Court of Jus-
tice, wishing to ascertain whether Articles 12 EC and 49 EC and Direc-
tive 96/71 preclude trade unions from attempting, by means of collective 
action, to force a foreign undertaking which posts workers to Sweden to 
apply a Swedish collective agreement.
The judgement
With regard to the right to strike as a fundamental right and within 
the scope of the freedoms, the Laval judgement developed the earlier po-
sition set out by the Viking ruling. The ECJ again applied the proportion-
ality test and stated that collective action for the protection of the workers 
of the host State against social dumping may constitute an overriding 
reason of public interest, which in principle justifi ed a restriction on one 
of the fundamental freedoms. The means of blockading action by a trade 
union falls within the objective of protecting workers. But in the actual 
case concerned, the action could not be justifi ed due to the incorrect im-
plementation of the posting of workers Directive.
Most of the judgement concerns the interpretation of this Directive. 
The ECJ was of the opinion that negotiation at the place of work, on a case-
by-case basis, when minimum rates of pay are not determined in accord-
ance with one of the means provided for by the posting of workers Direc-
tive, are not permissible under the Directive. The Court put into question 
the fl exibility of the Swedish collective bargaining system, emphasising the 
alleged lack of certainty for a business unable to ascertain in advance the 
conditions it would have to guarantee to its posted workers.
The objective of the Posting of Workers Directive is to lay down a set 
of mandatory rules for minimum protection to be observed in the host 
country by employers who post workers to perform temporary work in 
the territory of a Member State where the services are provided. The ECJ 
now judges that the Directive limits the level of protection guaranteed to 
posted workers. Neither the host Member State nor the social partners 
can ask for more favourable conditions, which go beyond the mandatory 
rules for minimum protection in the Directive. This is now often referred 
to as a change from a minimum to a maximum Directive. 
In the Laval and Viking cases, the ECJ stated that national employ-
ment law lies within the scope of the Community’s free movement legisla-
tion. This means that no special treatment is applied in the employment 
law sphere. The judges went even further when they considered that the 
freedoms can be invoked against trade unions, meaning that employers 
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can now take trade unions to court to obtain a judgement on the legality 
of a collective action.
The ECJ sees the right of trade unions to take collective action as 
a restriction on the freedom to provide services or the freedom of estab-
lishment. Collective action must be justifi ed. It must have a legitimate 
aim, respond to overriding reasons of public interest and be suitable 
to attain the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it. These conditions are often called the proportionality 
test, which is now introduced by the court with respect to trade union 
rights.
The protection of workers is a legitimate interest, which in princi-
ple justifi es a restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Treaty. It is in principle up to the national courts to ascertain 
whether the objectives pursued by means of collective action concern the 
protection of workers. However, the court lays out very strict guidelines 
to national courts with regard to how they have to judge such cases. The 
question they have to answer is whether the jobs and conditions of em-
ployment are really jeopardised or under serious threat by the behaviour 
of the enterprise.
To combat inferior working conditions of a ‘dump ing’ nature, Swed-
ish trade unions would initiate industrial action against a foreign em-
ployer in order to force him or her to sign the applicable Swedish collec-
tive agreement.74
Regarding the Laval case, we agree with Blanke that the ECJ in-
tervened in the very structures of industrial relations of an individual 
member state.75
Pursuant to Art 137 (4), ‘The provisions adopted pursuant to this Ar-
ticle shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing 
more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty.’
It is a fact that the Member State must regulate the right to strike 
with a view to Community law and established standards. It seems that 
the ECJ, without formal authorities, established precise borders regard-
74  Lex Britannia states that a collective agreement governed by the Swedish Co-Determina-
tion Act takes precedence over collective agreements governed by foreign law and that the 
legality of industrial action shall be governed by Swedish law alone. The peace obligation is 
also mod ifi ed to cover only collective agreements governed by Swedish law.  The legislator 
helps the trade unions combat social dumping by legislating a general reinforcement of the 
Swedish trade unions’ position in the collective bargaining system when they are dealing 
with foreign employers.
75  T Blanke, ‘Die Entscheidungen des EuGH in den Fällen Viking, Laval und Rueffert-Do-
mestizierung des Strelkrechts und europaweite Nivellierung der industriellen Beziehungen’ 
<www.etui-rechs.org/Headline-issues /viking-Laval-rueffert/2-Articles> 5-6. See also T 
Blanke, ‘Streikende Wikinger vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof’ (2006) 1 AuR.
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ing the issue of strikes, even though it did refer to Art 2 and Art 3 TEC, as 
well as the mentioned socio-political goals of the Community.  
It also seems that the ECJ intervened in a very fl exible system 
of collective negotiations in Sweden, which will refl ect on employees’ 
wages. 
Only time will tell whether this case has exposed socio-political defi -
cits in the TEC. We hold that those defi cits are obvious, since we also 
encounter the question whether there is a structural socio-political error, 
because both in the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty the social rights of em-
ployees and their organisations are not, at fi rst sight, as rightly claimed 
by Kochner, treated with the same value as fundamental market freedoms 
(‘nicht mit gleichem Stellenwert wie die Grundfreiheiten geregelt’),76 espe-
cially in the context of the relations between Art 11 EHRC and Arts 5 and 
6 of the European Social Charter, and within the context of Arts 6 and 
Art 136 EC Treaty, which represent the most prominent references to 
these rights.  
The future will also raise the question of the conduct of Member 
States, and their resort to the opt-out clause77 regarding fundamental 
social rights and their obligatory character, especially in the light of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Another problem is the function and legitimacy of the right of collec-
tive action in the light of the open methods of coordination (OMC). In this 
context, ‘deliberative polyarchy’ between institutions and civil society is 
to be observed. The concept of polyarchy is to be connected with perma-
nent imbalance resulting from material and procedural competences, on 
different lower levels.78 Polyarchy has therefore a dual dimension: demo-
cratic representation and decentralisation. Deliberativeness marks the 
adjustment of different positions due to the direct interaction and rational 
argumentation of participants in the decision process.79 Therefore, refl ex-
ivity points to the need for the coordination and mutual understanding of 
functionally distinct groups within a society.
76  Kochner (n 71) 16.
77  Protocol (no 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, OJ C306 of 17 December 2007.
78  S Baric, ‘Civilno društvo i regionalna suradnja u kontekstu odnosa Republike Hrvatske 
s Europskom unijom’ in N Bodiroga-Vukobrat and S Baric (eds), Prekogranicna i regionalna 
suradnja (Rijeka, 2007) 123.
79  O Gerstenberg and C Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for 
Europe?’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Mar-
ket (OUP 2002) 292.
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Orlandini80 does not agree with Novitz81 who, ‘among the few  that 
have tackled  the issue  of the relationship  between the right to strike 
and the ‘deliberative’ model of democracy, concludes  that  this model is 
the least capable of providing argument for the legitimacy of the recogni-
tion of that right’. 
Our position is closer to that of Novitz, because the refl exivity of 
deliberative polyarchy points to the necessity for the coordination and 
mutual understanding of functionally distinct groups. 
V. Conclusion 
The related problems of exercising social rights, including attaining 
the goals of the general social policies established by the EC Treaty, the 
creation of a European value system, and especially the issues of the re-
lation between national and European fundamental human rights stand-
ards, have a national and European dimension.
Both judgements covered in this paper show a more liberal and a 
less social approach through the certain precedence given to free move-
ment rights over the fundamental right to strike.82
The Viking and Laval cases show that a more fl exible approach 
instead of maximum harmonisation would be a better way to solve the 
problems and imbalance between the social and liberal approach. This 
80  ‘Procedural [law] ensures and legitimates the (open) confrontation between institutions 
and public (Community, national and local) subjects, social players and private organisa-
tions in the OMC framework. Yet also the rights that are protected and enforced by means 
of the new forms of soft regulation are ‘procedural’: the right to ‘lifelong’ learning, to equal 
opportunities, not to be discriminated on the grounds of one’s identity, the new workfare 
rights, the right to actively look for a job, the right to free access to employment services, the 
right to reconcile private life and work, the right to income ‘continuity’ when one does not 
work, and, on the collective level, the rights of information and consultation, that should 
feature more cooperative and less confrontational industrial relations thus rendering com-
panies more competitive. The European social citizenship, whose main constituents have 
been defi ned by the Nice Charter and that the OMC intends to translate into concrete social 
policies in the single national systems, should consist of those rights. In this context there 
seems to be no room for the right of collective action, as it is aimed at settling interests by 
means of negotiations and not in a ‘dialogic’ way, and since the weapon of the litigation does 
not match with the notion of procedural rights.’ See more in Orlandini (n 5) 50-53.
81  ‘It does […] appear that deliberative democracy calls into question the privileged access 
of workers’ and employers’ organizations. Moreover, it seems that their industrial weapon-
ry, including a right to strike, is to be left at the door to the debating chamber, for this would 
lead to bargaining rather than rational choice. Similarly, confl ict within the workplace is 
also no longer seen as a necessary feature of employment relations. Instead, workers are 
called upon to lay aside their perception of divergent interests, and instead work together in 
‘partnership’ with management to achieve ends which are of mutual benefi t to both. Within 
this framework, industrial action comes to be seen too confrontational to foster the trust 
needed for deliberation. It becomes redundant.’  See more in T Novitz, International and 
European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford, 2003) 185.
82  Reich (n 43) 128.
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is especially so bearing in mind the efforts to bridge the gap between 
the old and new Member States and the fact that the social structures 
in the Member States still remain within their own area of compe-
tence.
As the Commission has underlined the importance of the Austrian 
model in its Green Paper ‘Modernisation of labour law to meet the chal-
lenges of the 21st century’, the question is raised about the always fa-
voured Scandinavian social model. Is it really true that this model may 
be endangered if EC law interferes in its working by imposing its specifi c 
rules on free movement?
Also, concerning the question of deregulation of national labour 
rules and codifi cation at the European level in relation to social dialogue, 
we can ask whether collective bargaining and the protection of workers 
are still key elements in the European Social Model83 and how the prob-
lems can be solved. There are indeed numerous questions which open a 
number of new topics.
Is fl exicurity one of the more fl exible approaches in solving problems 
in labour law on the supranational level?
It is clear that the neo-liberal concept and globalisation require more 
elastic forms of typical labour relations than those shown in the Laval 
and Viking cases.84
It seems that the best solution for the preservation of the European 
Social Model is to return to the principle of differentiated integration. 
It would thus be possible to tie two requirements: acknowledgement of 
the differences and integration of the different features, without curtail-
ing the different social standards achieved in Member States. In fact, 
open methods of coordination (OMC) are following that path. Although 
originally introduced in the area of employment and social policy, they 
are increasingly used in other policy areas as well. We fi nd that OMC85 
are particularly applicable in this fi eld, since, in essence, the methods 
allow Member States to keep their formal competence in certain areas, 
while formulating joint aims at Community level, which can be achieved 
through a ‘soft law’ approach (eg benchmarking). 
83  <www.etuc.org : http://www.etuc.org/a/2771>. 
84  We agreed a year ago with S Weatherill and his three critical perspectives: ‘Is this ‘Better 
Regulation’? Is this ‘Simplifi cation’? Is maximum harmonisation in a horizontal measure 
of this breadth a step too far in favour of centralisation and against local autonomy in 
Europe?’ S Weatherill, ‘The EC Service Directive - why…and why not’ (presentation in ‘Ad-
vanced Issues of European Law’ Dubrovnik 2007).
85  D Hodson, I Maher, ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance. The Case of 
Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39 (4) Journal of Common Market Studies 719-
746.
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The OMC method is sensitive to national, regional and local differ-
ences, which are left to Member States’ sovereignty, providing at the same 
time for a sustainable European Social Model.  
Apparently, the ECJ does not seem to refl ect either of its recent rul-
ings in the light of the European Social Model and available instruments, 
but rather endorses the opinion that an economic approach and market 
demands predominate over social ones. 
Since it opted for an economic approach, the ECJ should have then 
taken into account fl exicurity principles as an attempt to unite two fun-
damental needs. Promoting a combination of fl exible labour markets and 
a high level of employment and income security is thus seen to be the 
answer to the EU’s dilemma on how to maintain and improve competi-
tiveness while preserving the European Social Model.   
Perhaps we can borrow the topic of the work of Federico Ortino86 
in the fi eld of International Economic Law ‘From ‘non-discrimination’ to 
‘reasonableness’’ and add it to European Labour Law to avoid the gap 
between the liberal and social model.
But the most important question still remains: is it possible to en-
sure the sustainability of the European Social Model?
The question remains because it is clear that achieving the freedom 
to provide services and ensuring market freedoms represent a silent ero-
sion of the European Social Model.
86  F Ortino, ‘From “non-discrimination” to “reasonableness”: a paradigm shift in international 
economic law?’ (2005) Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/2005.
